Trends. Head Count and Nuclear War: What To Believe by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 9 Issue 17 Article 2 
11-17-2000 
Trends. Head Count and Nuclear War: What To Believe 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Other Political 
Science Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Political Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (2000) "Trends. Head Count and Nuclear War: What To Believe," International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology: Vol. 9 : Iss. 17 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol9/iss17/2 
This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
1 
 
Title: Trends. Head Count and Nuclear War: What To Believe 
Author: Editor 
Volume: 9 
Issue: 17 
Date: 2000-11-17 
Keywords: Deterrence, Nuclear War 
 
Sometimes one might forget the ongoing threat of nuclear war, what with all the daily political crises 
that pop up on the world stage. Yet, there appear to be at least three significant conundrums in planning 
to deter nuclear war. 
 
First, is decapitation a sought for goal or one to be avoided? In other words, should one advocate for 
efficient and robust command, control, communications, and intelligence systems for all the world's 
political actors so that no one is strategically blind and so that everyone can flexibly adapt to changing 
situations--even if one is also making potential adversaries more formidable? Or should one seek to 
blind and deter adaptation so that potential adversaries are less formidable--even if they then become 
less responsive to situational changes and cannot stop falling into war even if this were desired? 
 
Second, denotations of some nuclear weapons-related language seem to lack clear ontological validity. 
For example, the denotations of tactical versus strategic, theatre versus national missile defense, and 
even offensive versus defensive weapons defy consensual explication and exemplification. Yet such 
language appears in nuclear weapons-related treaties. 
 
Third, the very notion of nuclear deterrence is muddied in that much that is posited to be deterrent also 
can be posited to be provocative. Such is the case in analyzing the putative consequences of national 
missile defense, increases and decreases in nuclear warheads and delivery systems, and so on. 
 
The exacting and highly specialized world of nuclear weapons strategy masks huge divergences of 
opinion about fundamentals, while assertions of certainty mask conceptual anarchism and chaos. 
Regardless of change in the post-Cold War and post-postmodern world, the sword of Damocles remains. 
(See Douglas, N.L. (2000). Enemies of critical thinking: Lessons from social psychology research. Reading 
Psychology, 21, 129-144; Forden, G. (September 6, 2000). World War III? Now? The New York Times, p. 
A31; Glanz, J. (September 4, 2000). Other systems might provide a U.S. missile shield. The New York 
Times, p. A1, A6; Smythe, W. E., & Chow, S. L. (1998). The formal and mental structures of semiotic 
processes. Theory and Psychology, 8, 783-803; Williams, R.L. (1999). Operational definitions and 
assessment of higher-order cognitive constructs. Educational Psychology Review, 11, 411-427; Winn, W., 
Hoffman, H., & Osberg, K. (1999). Semiotics, cognitive theory and the design of objects, actions and 
interactions in virtual environments. Journal of Structural Learning and Intelligent Systems, 14, 29-49.) 
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